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Do We Want a United Germany?

by James P. Warburg

The United States, Britain and France proposed in Paris on November 5 that the United Nations appoint a commission to study whether free elections in all of Germany are possible. What is the significance of this proposal? Does it indicate that the Western powers are now prepared to give up West German rearmament in order to accomplish their original aim of establishing a unified, democratic and demilitarized German nation? Or is this merely a move in the political warfare game, designed to draw a refusal from the Kremlin and thus to provide a rationalization for the continuation of present policy?

This observer warned in January 1948 that the creation of a West German republic would bring on a Russian attempt to oust the Western powers from Berlin, as well as the creation of a Soviet slave-state in East Germany. He warned again, in 1949, that an extension of the Atlantic treaty into a commitment to defend Western Europe's frontiers at the Elbe River would sooner or later lead to a Western decision to rearm its two-thirds of Germany—a possibility then categorically denied by our government.

Later in 1949, the writer, convinced that this nation was following a path which led inevitably to German rearmament, issued a pamphlet pointing out that such an undertaking would actually weaken rather than strengthen the West European defense because:

1. The conditions on which West Germany would be willing to rearm and, if necessary, fight, were precisely those conditions which would destroy French, Dutch and Belgian morale.

2. The inclusion of Germans in a Western build-up along the Elbe River would make willing Soviet allies, instead of reluctant satellites, out of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

3. Rearmament of West Germany might well provoke a Russian attack before any sort of defense could be made ready.

In September 1950 the United States formally proposed the inclusion of West German contingents in the Western defense force. Moscow promptly announced that this could not be "tolerated" and put forward the first of a long series of successively more specific feelers indicating a desire to resume the discussion of German unification.

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The two obstacles on which earlier attempts at unification had broken down were Russia's insistence on continuing reparations out of German production and its refusal to allow genuinely free all-German elections and a constitution guaranteeing political freedoms. This observer has maintained for over a year that it was quite possible—although by no means certain—that Russia might now be prepared to remove both obstacles in order to avoid the rearming of West Germany. He has repeatedly urged that our government take the initiative in finding out whether such a change of heart had actually taken place, or whether the Russian overtures were merely a bluff, designed to make Russia appear as the champion of that unity which all Germans crave, as against a Western coalition which desired to keep Germany divided and to use the West Germans as “cannon-fodder.”

The opportunity to make such a move when the Big Four foreign ministers' deputies met last spring was lost, probably because our government had become impaled on a dilemma created by its own two conflicting aims. It could not accomplish its original aim of unifying all of Germany without giving up its subsequent cold-war aim of rearming West Germany. Placed before this choice, Washington has created the impression that it does not want German unification, even if it could be obtained on the original Western terms—that is, even if Russia would forego reparations and consent to free elections and the creation of a

Germany which would be free and democratic in the Western meaning of those words.

Would Germany Go Communist?

Washington's attitude is affected not only by its reluctance to forego German rearmament. The Administration also has a deep-seated fear that a unified, free and democratic Germany might, especially if it were forced to remain demilitarized, succumb to Communist subversion or penetration. This is sheer defeatism which actually assumes that communism has a stronger appeal to free men than democracy. An anxiety of this sort might well be justified as to a unified and free Korea; yet we are apparently willing to take our chances on free elections supervised by the United Nations in that unhappy country. To fear that a free Germany would “go Com-

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unist,” or be subverted to communism, is actually nothing more than a panic-inspired fantasy on the part of those who have no real confidence in the way of life we are trying so hard to defend. A free Germany might—thanks to our own failures—go neo-Nazi, especially a rearmed free Germany; and a re-armed, neo-Nazi Germany might

well, some day, line up against us with Russia. But a free Germany will go neither neo-Nazi nor Communist unless the German people are denied those things which are the substance of freedom and democracy by a government once more controlled by tainted bureaucrats and antidemocratic industrial barons. A free election in Germany, if held today, would result in a far smaller Communist minority than that which exists in France.

Does the recent Paris proposal mean that the Western powers have come to the conclusion that they want a free, democratic, united and demilitarized Germany, as a necessary step toward the ultimate achievement of peace based upon universal disarmament? One can only hope that it does. One can only hope that the Western powers are not merely seeking a Russian refusal which will enable them to say, “See, it's no use,” and thus provide a rationalization for continuing their present course.

Such a refusal might make us look more innocent and the Russians more guilty if war comes. But it will not get us off the road to a war in which there can be no such thing as victory and after which there can be no just and enduring peace. The prospects are rendered no brighter by the cynical and incredibly callous laughter with which the Soviet foreign minister chose to greet the latest Western proposals.

(Mr. Warburg is the author of *Faith, Purpose and Power, Victory Without War* and many other books and pamphlets on foreign affairs.)

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More U.S. Aid for Europe?

The necessity for strengthening the foundations of United States policy in Europe is high among the problems which beset President Truman in his autumn retreat at Key West, Florida. The visit of General Dwight D. Eisenhower on November 5, on the eve of the President's departure for the South, coincided with growing concern on the part of American officials as to whether Western Europe may have reached the limit of its capacity to rearm with the kind of aid the United States now gives.

Problem for Congress

Europe is suffering from a new dollar and exchange crisis aggravated by rearmament. The increase in the cost of raw materials resulting from the Korean war has shot expenses sky-high. The intensification of austerity resulting from the restrictions on imports announced on November 6 by Chancellor of the Exchequer Richard A. Butler emphasizes for the British the price they pay for arms.

These facts disprove the belief, nurtured earlier this year in Washington, that the Marshall plan had prepared the Western European economy to absorb the strain of supporting the heavier military burdens which America's allies are attempting to assume. This belief induced the Administration to stress military aid almost to the exclusion of economic aid, as far as Europe is concerned, in the foreign aid program which Mr. Truman submitted to Congress last spring and which was enacted into law in October. Unless the President can find new means for assisting Europe, the base

of the North Atlantic alliance will remain weak and prospects for the future development of the European army, which General Eisenhower commands, will remain in doubt.

The economic weakness of Europe is doubly serious, for Europeans and for Americans, because the possibility of gaining congressional support for new kinds of foreign aid programs is uncertain. At its recent session Congress would not appropriate as much as President Truman asked for foreign aid when he was confident that the program he then espoused was satisfactory and sufficient.

Yet Congress showed awareness of Europe's problems. The report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Mutual Security Act of 1951 said: "While it may seem that the contribution by the United States of more than \$5 billion to the defense of Europe, when those countries are contributing only \$8.5 billion themselves, means that the United States is carrying an undue proportion of the defense costs of Western Europe, two factors must be borne clearly in mind. The first is that quite properly the European countries are supplying most of the men to defend their own homelands. Secondly, the countries of Western Europe have a much thinner economic base from which to support their defensive effort than does the United States."

In working out at Key West the sections on foreign policy for his message on the State of the Union, President Truman cannot ignore the harsh facts that the treatment which Congress gave the Mutual Security Bill dims his hopes for a larger

armament appropriation aid next year. The assertion to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by William C. Foster, then Administrator for Economic Cooperation, that the job of the Marshall plan in Europe as originally contemplated was "virtually completed," is a stumbling block to revival of economic foreign aid.

Europe's Will to Arm

A few bright spots, however, relieve the prevailing gloom. One is the fact that European governments remain friendly to the American policy of rearmament. At a conference of North Atlantic treaty nations in Paris early this month they demonstrated that they had the will, if not the capacity, to support the United States. At this conference, where W. Averell Harriman, Mutual Security Director, represented the United States, the NATO military experts suggested the establishment of a European army of 1,290,000 men by 1953. Their figures represent an expansion of the existing plan, and the North Atlantic Council will consider them at its meeting in Rome on November 24. But the optimistic suggestion of the military experts cannot hide the fact that the development of the European army is lagging behind the plan already approved and that the new figures call for the inclusion of German divisions, although what military role if any Germany will play depends on political decisions yet to be made. How to fill the gap between will and capacity in the North Atlantic coalition is President Truman's current preoccupation.

BLAIR BOLLES



The Battle of Peace Plans

The United States, backed by Britain and France, beat the U.S.S.R. to the draw at the opening of the sixth United Nations General Assembly in Paris on November 6 when the Western powers presented an elaborate plan looking to the eventual reduction of armaments.

Three Questions

The Western plan envisages a cease-fire in Korea and progress toward settlement of other East-West issues. There would follow a UN census of all armed forces and armaments, including atomic bombs. Ultimately, the plan calls for balanced reduction of armed strength subject to strict international inspection. The disarmament proposal is an enlargement of the Baruch plan for atomic control submitted by the United States to the UN in 1946, which the U.S.S.R. has since then steadfastly opposed. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Y. Vishinsky asserted that the new Western plan had made him "laugh."

When Vishinsky, in turn, introduced the Russian plan for alleviation of world tensions, Western diplomats dismissed it as "ludicrous." Vishinsky called for a UN declaration that the Atlantic pact is illegal, which is bound to be rejected by the United States and its allies. He asked for an armistice line in Korea at the 38th Parallel, although the Chinese Communist negotiators had previously agreed to give up this line. He proposed a world conference outside the UN before June 1952 for the prohibition of atomic bombs and the reduction of other armaments, but with no mention of inspection. And he once again ad-

vocated conclusion of a "peace pact" by the Big Four and Communist China—a proposal unacceptable to the United States.

This first round in the propaganda battle between the West and the U.S.S.R. raises three questions:

1. Has the United States succeeded in undercutting the Kremlin's vigorous "peace campaign"? The informed consensus in the early stages of the General Assembly was that the Kremlin still retained the propaganda lead but that the United States scored an advantage by dramatically pointing out that it regards armaments as a harsh necessity imposed by Russian policies. This statement was essential to reassure our Western European allies, notably Britain and France, now facing economic difficulties under the strain of stepped-up rearmament.

2. Is it possible to have an effective inspection system, particularly of atomic bombs, which would not be rejected by Russia as a subterfuge for spying on its internal weaknesses and yet would be acceptable to Americans suspicious of Moscow's motives? Some military experts believe such a system could be worked out through international control of the raw materials needed to make armaments. The real obstacle to arms reduction, however, as Dr. Philip C. Jessup, United States delegate to the United Nations, said on November 9, is that this country does not trust Russia and assumes that the Russians do not trust us.

3. Should arms reduction precede settlement of outstanding East-West issues—Korea, Germany, Austria, Far Eastern problems—or proceed alongside political negotiations? Sec-

retary of State Dean Acheson, in his November 8 address to the General Assembly, stated that armaments and political issues should be considered "concurrently" and that "we must at the same time build strength and work for peace." Can East-West disputes be dealt with in the UN, or should conversations outside the UN be resumed?

What Kind of Negotiations?

If such conversations are to be held, should they be Big Four talks in Paris, as suggested by President Vincent Auriol of France at the opening of the Assembly? Or three-power talks between President Truman, Winston Churchill and Stalin?

The answer to these queries will probably have to wait until the British prime minister has visited Washington in January. Meanwhile, Mr. Churchill offered a clue to his own thoughts about the international situation on November 9 when he urged the Lord Mayor of London, by the use of "ordinary common sense," to keep the wooden figures of Gog and Magog, soon to decorate the Guildhall again, from colliding lest both "be smashed to pieces." The policy of keeping great powers separated, and thereby averting war, is not new to Britain. During the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth the British succeeded in "containing" Tsarist Russia with no armed conflict except the ill-starred Crimean campaign, managing affairs in such a way that Russia was on Britain's side in two world wars. Is Mr. Churchill, with his profound sense of history, thinking of a return to this policy?

VERA MICHELES DEAN

Malaya's Three-Way Problem



by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff

Virginia Thompson and her husband, Richard Adloff, made a study tour of Southeast Asia in 1946-47 under the auspices of the American Institute of Pacific Relations and the Southeast Asia Institute. Articles by them, individually or jointly, have appeared in *Far Eastern Survey*, *Pacific Affairs* and other periodicals. They contributed the chapter on Malaya to *The State of Asia* (New York, Knopf, 1951).

Malaya provides the astonishing spectacle of a dependent territory that is enjoying unprecedented prosperity and making some progress toward the achievement of a self-governing state while still in the throes of indecisive internal warfare. Thanks to its two chief industries, tin and rubber, Malaya has been prosperous, with few lapses, for a half-century. Its current boom, however, dates from the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950. In 1950 Malaya's rubber exports reached the record figure of 692,585 tons; its tin industry, far more damaged than its rubber industry during World War II, produced 57,500 tons, topping postwar exports but not yet attaining the highest prewar level. The prices for both commodities skyrocketed after mid-1950, but the resulting wealth has not been evenly spread among the population. Moreover, it is generally regarded as transient and has been accompanied by almost wholly uncontrolled inflation.

The Communal Problem

Obviously, Malaya's financial position would be even stronger were it not for what is euphemistically called "the Emergency," which is costing over U.S. \$141,000 a day and has already lasted more than three years. Both British and Malayan resources have been drawn upon for a vastly increased police force, an expanded Malay regiment, and a resettlement program for Chinese squatters. It is now realized, however, that none of these efforts will

be effective in quelling the Communist-led revolt unless they aid toward solving Malaya's communal problem—the chief internal obstacle now blocking the realization of a unified, democratic and self-governing country. Other such obstacles include the lack of trained personnel and vigorous native leadership, disunity among the Malays, and a still-feudal society in the Malay states.

In an area about the size of Florida live over 6 million people divided into three major communities, of which two—the Malays and Chinese—are almost equal numerically, and the third—Indians—form a sizeable minority. The Malay upper class hold many of the administrative positions on the mainland, while the Malay peasantry and fishermen produce only enough food to supply the requirements of their own community. The Chinese, about one-third of whom are immigrants, provide most of the nonagricultural labor, and their higher economic stratum controls the country's retail trade and many of its important industrial and banking enterprises. Indians furnish the bulk of Malaya's rubber tappers and a small but important segment of its merchants and professional men. But despite growing demands on the part of resident Asians for a greater share of power, the British continue to occupy the top posts in the political and economic spheres. What differentiates the Malaya picture from the classical colonial pattern in Southeast Asia is the mutually antagonistic nationalisms that have resulted

from Malaya's peculiar demographic make-up and the overwhelming preoccupation with economic gain on the part of all its communities except the Malays.

Japanese policy in wartime Malaya aimed at sowing discord between the Chinese and Malays, and since V.J. Day the British have had great difficulty in reconciling the apparently conflicting interests of those two communities. When the British reoccupied Malaya in September 1945 they were neither physically nor psychologically prepared to cope with the damage done to the country and its people during the Japanese occupation. They could not immediately remedy the prevailing shortages in food and consumer goods nor control the resulting spiraling cost of living. The accumulating grievances of the working classes, already acute under the Japanese regime, became ammunition for the Chinese-dominated Malayan Communist party, which made use of the good will engendered by its leadership of the anti-Japanese resistance movement to gain control of the labor organizations. The Communist party, however, engineered a series of strikes for political purposes which not only provoked retaliatory control measures by the British authorities but stimulated Britain to compete with the Communists in influencing the trend of Malayan trade unionism. Temporarily checked in the labor field, the Communist party deflected some of its energies to strengthen the local opponents of the successive constitu-

tional proposals for Malaya put forward by London.

Malayan Federation

The product of the first of these proposals was the Malayan Union, set up in April 1946. The aims of this wartime brain-child of the British government were to simplify Malaya's cumbersome prewar administrations, grant larger political privileges to the domiciled Chinese and Indians, and temporarily separate the administration of Chinese-dominated Singapore from that of the predominantly Malay peninsula. This plan, first, deprived the nine Malay sultans of the last attributes of their sovereignty; second, it granted "citizenship" privileges to non-Malays on the mainland without, however, requiring them to renounce other national loyalties; and third, it inevitably widened the gap between mercantile Singapore and the tin and rubber-producing mainland.

No group in Malaya reacted favorably to the Malayan Union scheme, but its most fervent opponents were the conservative Malays, who objected to equal rights for non-Malays. These conservatives joined forces in the United Malay National Organization, led by the premier of Johore State, Dato Onn bin Jaafar. In the face of this unexpected Malay opposition, Britain back-tracked and, after prolonged and secret negotiations with the United Malay National Organization, produced in December 1946 the compromise and frankly interim Federation plan. This proposal virtually restored the sultans to their prewar position, paved the way for a constitutional framework of government in the Malay states, tightened the citizenship requirements for resident non-Malays, and still permitted Singapore a freer hand to advance more

rapidly than the Federation toward self-government. The Malayan Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Indians felt themselves politically disinherited by the creation of the Federation in February 1948.

Violent crime, endemic in Malaya since the end of the war, rapidly increased during the spring of 1948. But it was not until the murder of two British planters in June that the government formally recognized the wave of violence as an Emergency—spelled with a capital—and assumed dictatorial powers. In Singapore the police beat the Communists to the draw, and thus that great port was spared most of the strife that has since afflicted the peninsula. However, the riots in December 1950 over the local court's pro-European decision in the case of the Dutch girl, Maria Hertogh, who had married a Malay, showed how near the surface communal tensions were in Singapore and how unreliable and incapable the city's police proved in its handling of the mob. In the Federation most of the Communist leaders escaped to the jungle where they reorganized their wartime comrades into combatant guerrillas and pursued the same tactics against the British that they had perfected during their resistance to the Japanese.

The Communist revolt was not nearly swift or strong enough to displace the British government and set up a Communist "Malayan People's Democratic Republic." So far as can be ascertained, it has not received active support from outside the country, and it is unique in all Southeast Asia in that it has produced no outstanding leader. Moreover, it has not checked expansion of the tin and rubber industries nor prevented some progress being made toward self-government, state-financed social services and

Western-type trade unionism. The Communists have, however, succeeded in slowing down the tempo of such progress by deflecting government funds and energies to defense measures and, more important, by neutralizing the Malayan Chinese who, as a community, have furnished both the main perpetrators and the major victims of the revolt. It is largely by preferring to pay "protection" money and to withhold information about "bandit" activities, rather than by active support or ideological sympathy, that the majority of the Chinese in Malaya have failed to cooperate in stamping out the Communist-led revolt. They are unwilling to expose themselves to the Communist party's brutal retaliation for the sake of a government that has favored the Malays at their expense—particularly in view of the rapid rise of a strong, British-recognized regime in China which has loudly championed the cause of its overseas nationals "oppressed" by the imperialist powers.

The Briggs Plan

In the early months of 1950, even before the Korean war broke out, military reinforcements were urgently dispatched to Malaya from Britain and Hongkong to cope with the worst terrorist activity yet known in the peninsula. At the same time Sir Harold Briggs was sent out from London to coordinate and direct all operations arising out of the Emergency, with responsibility only to Commissioner-General Malcolm MacDonald. Briggs arrived at a moment of mounting tension; civilian morale was being undermined by the intensification of terrorist incidents, and Communist propaganda and organization were known to be gaining a stronger hold on the local Asian population. He soon recognized that the problem

was not purely a military one. Unless Malaya were actually invaded, neither side could hope to accomplish much more than a holding operation, given the jungle terrain and guerrilla-type warfare. The immediate problem was to eliminate the support given to the "bandits," voluntarily or otherwise, by the communities of Chinese squatters who lived along the jungle fringes, near the population centers, and who afforded shelter, food and funds to the insurgents.


For many years squatters, mostly Chinese, had illegally cultivated unused lands and had supplied some of the labor force for neighboring estates and mines. These squatter communities had grown enormously during the frequent population displacements characteristic of the Japanese occupation and unsettled post-war period, until in 1950 they probably numbered about 400,000 individuals. Their economic importance in supplying food and workers to a country deficient in both these essentials was so great that no serious effort had been made theretofore either to dispossess them of the land or to bring them under administrative control. The Briggs plan, based on existing projects and announced in June 1950, aimed, in part, to regroup these scattered communities in new localities where they could give neither aid nor comfort to the enemy and where they could be controlled by the authorities. Obviously such large-scale displacements required considerable funds, a greatly enlarged police force, and the consent of the Malay authorities to the influx of so large a number of undesired aliens. Less obvious was the long-term character of this scheme and its practical implications. Working closely together, the police, the military and civil administrators began operating the

plan northward, starting with Johore and Negri Sembilan, and by mid-1951 guerrilla warfare had been partially checked and about 280,000 squatters had already been resettled. Wherever the Briggs plan has been applied, terrorism has markedly diminished, and even the most out-

strife, comparative budgetary prosperity, compactness and relative homogeneity, has forged ahead of the Federation. It now has an unofficial and partly elected majority on its Legislative Council (the term "unofficial," used as a noun or adjective, refers usually to those members of government bodies who are not serving automatically as civil servants); it boasts a modern municipal system governed by a commission, two-thirds of whose members are elected; and it has produced two political parties representing the local population on an intercommunal basis. Moreover, it has been carrying out plans for more low-cost housing, free and compulsory primary education, and expanded medical services. The Federation, on the other hand, has as yet no elected bodies, although municipal elections are to be held in the near future and a pseudo-parliamentary system was superimposed in April 1951 on the appointive Federal Legislative Council. Politics, insofar as they exist on the mainland, have—again in contrast to Singapore—developed along communal lines. But here, too, the leadership given by the British through the Communities Liaison Committee and by outstanding communal leaders has been producing a more "Malayan" outlook. By no means all members of the three chief communal organizations—the United Malay National Organization, the Malayan Chinese Association and the Malayan Indian Congress—go along with the more liberal policy recently adopted by their leaders, but the current insurrection and events elsewhere in Asia have moderated their communal bias.

In mid-September 1951 a new intercommunal organization was formed at Kuala Lumpur by Dato Onn, with the aim of achieving independence for Malaya within seven

Malaya



spoken critics of the government's ineffectuality in handling the insurrection have criticized, not the plan's basic tenets, but merely the delay in giving it wide application.

The main virtue of the Briggs plan has been its insistence, not on achieving immediate military results, but on the primary necessity for social and economic rehabilitation. In the political field, too, the British realize that the crux of their problem lies in gaining and holding the trust of all the Asian resident communities. Singapore, by virtue of its separate status, freedom from armed

years. Reportedly this new party has the support of the veteran Straits-born Chinese, Tan Cheng Lock, and of other influential communal leaders. Its platform, still vague, presumably includes retaining ties with the British Commonwealth, uniting Singapore with the Federation, reducing the sultans to the status of constitutional monarchs, and giving equal rights to all residents who offer proof of their first loyalty to Malaya. Even if such a program should result in no more than the creation of a truly Malayan nationality, this would be an impressive accomplishment.

From the external point of view the chief impediments to realizing a united, potentially democratic Malaya lie at the moment in the influence exerted on the local Chinese by a resurgent China and on the Malays by the hope, even though remote, of alignment with a strong Indonesia. Internally, communalism, although tending to decline, remains a stumbling block, as is the prevailing materialism. Business-as-usual is a congenial slogan officially encouraged because of the importance of Malaya's tin and rubber production to Britain's dollar earnings and to all the countries building up "defense" economies. The traditional aversion of Malaysians towards any increase in taxation or govern-

mental controls over business has been vividly illustrated by their recent recalcitrance in regard to the imposition of an income tax, an increased rubber duty and a destination control over their rubber exports. All the development schemes that have so far been drawn up for increasing Malaya's economic productivity have had to rely on financing from Britain.

Although the political and social achievements of Singapore and, to a much lesser extent, the Federation since the end of the war have been revolutionary as compared with those of the prewar era, they still fall far short of meeting the needs or fulfilling the desires of Malaya's rapidly expanding population. Events

outside Malaya (and these, much more than internal revolution, may determine the country's future) may either sharply accelerate the pace or sweep the whole present structure away. In the latter contingency, the inhabitants will not have enough time to achieve political democracy by evolutionary means.

READING SUGGESTIONS: *A Social Survey of Singapore* (Department of Social Welfare, Singapore, 1947); E. H. G. Dobby, *Malaya and the Malaysians* (London, University of London Press, 1948); Rupert Emerson, *Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule* (New York, Macmillan, 1937); Lennox A. Mills, *British Rule in Eastern Asia* (London, Oxford, 1942); Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya* (New York, Oxford, 1948); Tan Cheng Lock, *Malayan Problems, From a Chinese Point of View* (Singapore, 1947); Virginia Thompson, *Postmortem on Malaya* (New York, Macmillan, 1943).

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